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ABSTRACT
Various interorganizational systems (IOS) such as Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)
and Supply Chain Management Systems (SCMS) have attracted significant attention among
information system (IS) researchers. However, IS scholars have taken less interest in Online
Reverse Auctions (ORAs), a widely used IOS in online business-to-business transactions.
This study examines the factors that enable and/or inhibit ORA use from the perspective
of buyers and suppliers, as well as the potential role of the institutional context based on a
case study of a French retailer. Building on 122 semi-structured interviews collected in two
stages with various stakeholders from the interorganizational community (buyers, suppliers
and technology initiators), we demonstrate the extent to which the determinants of ORA
use differ between buyers and suppliers (e.g. perceived outcomes, capabilities required to
use ORAs). We then show how a change in the institutional context not only failed to
redress distrust between buyers and suppliers, but also created new barriers to ORA use
by introducing controls and sanctions that outweighed the economic benefits of ORA use
among buyers. We contribute to the IS literature by demonstrating the role of strategic
capabilities in shaping use. While the IS literature acknowledges the institutional context as
a determinant of use, little is known about the extent to which a change in the institutional
context may affect ORA use. Our research shows the extent to which legislation can trigger
IT discontinuance because of the perceived risk introduced.

Keywords: Online Reverse Auctions, use, enablers, barriers, legislation, risk of control
and sanctions.
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RÉSUMÉ
En dépit de l’intérêt croissant des chercheurs SI aux systèmes inter-organisationnels tels
que l’échange de données électronique (EDI) et les systèmes de gestion de la chaîne logistique
(SGCL), peu de recherches se sont intéressées aux enchères électroniques inversées (EEI),
un système d’information inter-organisationnel largement utilisé dans les transactions
électroniques inter-firmes.
Cette étude a pour objectif de mettre en évidence les déterminants d’usage des EEI suivant
la perspective des acheteurs et celle des fournisseurs ainsi que le rôle potentiel du contexte
institutionnel à travers une étude de cas réalisée auprès d’un distributeur français. Nous
avons mené 122 entretiens semi-directifs en deux phases auprès des différents membres
de la communauté inter-organisationnelle (acheteurs, fournisseurs et les initiateurs de
la technologie) concernés par l’utilisation des EEI. Nos résultats mettent en évidence des
différences entre les acheteurs et les fournisseurs quant à leurs déterminants d’usage.
Nous montrons ensuite comment un changement du contexte institutionnel peut impacter
l’usage des EEI. En effet, alors que la loi n’a pas permis de remédier au climat de méfiance
qui prévaut entre acheteurs et fournisseurs, elle a créé de nouvelles barrières à l’usage
pour les acheteurs. Plus particulièrement, les risques de contrôle et de sanction introduits
par la loi sont à l’origine de nouvelles barrières à l’utilisation des EEI pour les acheteurs.
Nous contribuons à la littérature SI en montrant le rôle des capacités organisationnelles à
influencer l’usage. Alors que le rôle déterminant du contexte institutionnel pour expliquer
l’usage a été largement reconnu dans la littérature SI, notre compréhension de l’impact du
changement du contexte institutionnel sur les déterminants de l’usage est encore limitée.
Nous mettons en évidence l’étendue à laquelle la loi peut être à l’origine de la discontinuité
d’usage à cause du risque perçu qu’elle introduit.

Mots-clés : Enchères électroniques inversées, utilisation, facteurs favorisant l’usage,
barrières à l’usage, risque de contrôle et de sanction.

INTRODUCTION
Successful interorganizational relationships are crucial to organizational performance (Gulati and Sytch, 2007; Palmatier
et al, 2007; Chaparro-Pelaez et al., 2014).
In order to build and maintain successful relationships with trading partners in
areas such as procurement and supply
chain management, firms increasingly
rely on interorganizational systems (IOS).
Gartner points to the heavy investment in
IT (up to $3.7 trillion), including US $296
billion for IOS such as electronic data in-

terchange (EDI) and supply chain management systems (SCMS). This illustrates
the degree to which IOS use by trading
partners has become a critical requirement for business operations (Iacovou
et al., 1995; Mukhopadhyay et al., 1995;
Wang, 2014; Reimers, Johnston and Klein,
2014).
Today, firms are using IOS to improve
their purchasing performance (Cousins
and Spekman, 2003; Ellram, 1996). IOS
help firms to compare supplier prices,
assess alternative supply sources, negotiate better contracts (Johnston and Vitale,
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1988) and benchmark suppliers (Riggins and Mukhopadhyay, 1994), which
explains business organizations’ willingness to invest heavily in this area (Meier,
1995). Among such IOS, Online Reverse
Auctions (ORAs) have become a popular basis for conducting business transactions in numerous industries such as
retail (Hawkins et al., 2014, Jap, 2007).
Its role in improving the procurement
process has been acknowledged in many
organizations (Standing et al., 2013). The
process is considered “as the interface between an organization and its suppliers”
(Rai et al., 2008, p.336). ORAs support the
negotiation process within inter-organizational relationships (Jap & Haruvy, 2008)
and viewed as an IOS (da Silveira and Cagliano, 2006; Charki et al., 2011)
Online reverse auctions are an aspect
of the trading platforms hosted by virtual
market makers that provide the technological infrastructure and platforms
needed to handle supply and demand
(Pinker et al., 2003). Consequently, in
contrast to offline auctions, transactions
made through online auctions are not
dyadic but are triadic in nature between
a buying firm and preselected suppliers.
For Smart and Harisson (2003) “Online
reverse auctions (ORAs) are exactly the
way they sound: traditional auctions
in Reverse. Instead of a seller offering a
product for sale to the highest bidder, a
buyer offers a tender or contract for the
supply of specific goods or services. Suppliers compete for the right to the contract by bidding reducing prices, until a
final price – the lowest – brings the auction to an end” (p. 257).
ORAs are widely used by the procurement organizations of many Fortune
Global 2000 corporations (Giampietro

1

and Emiliani, 2007) and government
agencies (Ivory, 2014) to source a variety
of goods and services. Firms such as Dell,
GE, GlaxoSmithKline, the Formosa Group
and HP encourage their suppliers to compete for purchase orders through ORAs
(Chang, 2007) which account for around
10 to 15 percent of total corporate purchasing expenditure (Emiliani and Stec
2005). According to the Institute for Supply Management and Forrester Research
(2013),1 85% of companies surveyed declared they had shifted towards e-sourcing tools such as ORAs to procure their
suppliers’ services.
At the same time, despite their growing use, ORAs have received little attention from IOS researchers and little is
known about the determinants of their
use (Mithas et al., 2008). Most IOS studies
have focused on either the buyer or the
supplier side (Venkatesh and Bala, 2008)
and so little is known about the factors
affecting the different firms engaged in
IOS use. Moreover, few studies have investigated the interorganizational context
of IOS use (Kurnia and Johnston, 2000;
Rodon et al., 2011) or the extent to which
a change in this context can impact on
use (Kurnia and Johnston, 2000). Given
all this, our paper poses the following
research question: What are the determinants of ORA use from the vantage point
of buyers and suppliers and how can a
change in the institutional context affect
such use?
In order to answer our research question, we conducted a large-scale qualitative case study in two stages, separated
by one major institutional change. During the first stage, our goal was to gain
insights into the enablers and barriers to
the use of this type of IOS. Subsequently,

http://www.procureport.com/news_aug_28_2013.html
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as the institutional context of ORA use
evolved, we were keen to understand
the implications of such changes with regard to use. We therefore conducted 122
semi-structured interviews across the two
phases of our study over a 3-year period
with the main stakeholders of the interorganizational community interested in the
IOS of online reverse auction technology.
Our findings suggest that determinants
of use differ between buyers and suppliers, and that the new institutional context may influence these determinants.
We demonstrate that the new law fails
to promote the use of ORAs by suppliers
since it does not redress the prevailing
climate of distrust between buyers and
suppliers caused by the opportunistic
practices previously adopted by some
buyers. However, unexpectedly, the new
law appears to have created new barriers
due to the additional complexity of ORA
use. Our results have diverse implications
for both researchers and practitioners. We
highlight the extent to which focusing on
a specific firm can give a partial understanding of IOS use. We also show that
determinants of use are not static but may
vary following a change in the context of
use. From a managerial perspective, we
illustrate the extent to which an intervention that aims to regulate use can impact
on the determinants of use and even create new barriers.
Our article is organized as follows. First,
we review the existing literature on IT use
with a focus on the determinants of ORA
use. The review showed that this form of
IOS has largely been covered in terms of
perceived outcomes (enablers and barriers), while the role of organizational capabilities tends to have been ignored in explaining usage. Moreover, most research
does not take the institutional context in
which IOS use is embedded into account,
which limits our understanding of the

determinants of use following a change
in the context. Second, we show the extent to which our interpretive approach,
embedded in a single case study, enabled
us to capture the patterns that would
have been difficult to discern otherwise.
Thirdly, we present our results and discuss both our theoretical contributions
and the managerial implications.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
We first review the literature on IT implementation and use and show the extent
to which additional factors are needed to
explain ORA use given its interorganizational nature. Research on ORAs to date
has mainly focused on perceived outcomes to explain its use. However, the
IOS literature also points to the role of
organizational capabilities as well as that
of the institutional environment (Robey
et al., 2008; Kurnia and Johnston, 2000).
We thus discuss the extent to which these
two determinants matter in the context of
IOS use.

2.1. IT implementation and use
in organizations
IT implementation in organizations is
typically a multi-stage process, from initiation of the IT, to its adoption, adaptation,
acceptance, routinization and infusion
(Cooper and Zmud, 1990). The first three
phases are defined at the organizational
level. In the first phase the organization
identifies an unmet need or opportunity
and scans the environment looking for
possible technologies to meet that need
(initiation). It then selects a specific IT
and decides to invest in the resources to
implement it (adoption). Finally, it installs
and/or customizes the IT to its needs
while also modifying organizational pol-
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icies and procedures to accommodate
the new IT (adaptation). In our case, the
search for an ORA begins at the initiation
stage, followed by organizational adoption and/or adaptation of the system to
organizational needs.
The last three phases represent the behaviors of the intended individual users
of the IT in question within the adopting
organization. During these phases, users
commit to using the IT (acceptance), use
the IT as a normal or routine activity in
their work (routinization), and/or use IT
in a comprehensive manner to improve
organizational effectiveness or to support
higher-order work (infusion). Although
initiation, adoption, and/or adaptation are
prerequisite conditions for the successful
use of organizational IT such as ORAs, the
success of the system depends on individual users acceptance (or rejection) of
the IT, and its subsequent routinized and
infused use. Just because an IT is adopted
and installed in an organization does not
mean that it will be accepted and used by
organizational users. If IT use is voluntary,
individual users may reject the IT for reasons such as lack of utility or usability. On
the other hand, if IT use is mandated, users may use it reluctantly and be unhappy
with the choice forced on them. Some
users may even try to delay, obstruct or
underutilize the new IT (Jasperson et al.,
2005). In fact, the fail rate of IT implementation has remained high over the
last 30 years, at around 70% (Cecez-Kecmanovic and Kautz, 2014).
In view of the importance of individual-level IT use for the success of organizational IT, a large body of IT acceptance
research has examined the factors that
drive IT use and/or the constraints that
limit it. Factors include perceived usefulness, ease of use, social norms, facilitating conditions, personal innovativeness,

self-efficacy, habit and enjoyment (see
Lee et al. 2003, Legris et al. 2003, and
Venkatesh et al. 2003 for extensive reviews). These factors have been distilled
into many models designed to predict IT
use, such as the technology acceptance
model (TAM) (Davis et al. 1989) and
UTAUT2 (Venkatesh et al. 2012). In general, the factors presumed to influence IT
use can be grouped into three sets: (1)
individual assessment of IT features such
as its usefulness and ease of use, (2) individual user characteristics such as IT
self-efficacy and intrinsic motivation, and
(3) characteristics of the immediate task
environment such as social influence or
facilitating conditions (Van Offenbeek et
al. 2013).
Despite the above body of knowledge,
the determinants of ORA use remain unclear. Although one may expect several
of the factors described above to be pertinent to ORA use, given the unique interorganizational nature of ORAs, several
additional interorganizational factors may
also influence ORA acceptance and use
that have not previously been considered
in the literature. One of the objectives of
our paper is to identify such factors.

2.2. Perceived outcomes as the
main determinants of ORA use
ORAs were designed to help buyers
improve their economic purchasing performance (Jap, 2003; Williams and Dobie, 2011). They result in cost reductions
(Smart and Harrison, 2003; Smeltzer and
Carr, 2003) and ostensibly enable buyers
to discover ‘real’ market prices (Grewal
et al., 2003). ORA use also tends to result
in more flexible negotiation processes,
wider sourcing horizons (Daly and Nath,
2005; Jap, 2002) and reduced administrative and logistics costs (Hur et al., 2007).
Furthermore, buyers can use ORAs to
11
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shake up their suppliers, encouraging
them to reconsider their cost structures
and be more competitive (Jap, 2001).
For suppliers, ORAs may offer a range
of benefits. The IOS implies a more open
tender process, and provides potential
access to new buyers, greater visibility of
competitor pricing and an overview of
competing bidders and market activities.
ORAs constitute an excellent opportunity
for suppliers to benchmark against their
rivals, assess their competitiveness and
obtain an overview of the market in which
they are active (Daly and Nath, 2005). In
addition, it gives them an opportunity to
penetrate new markets since buyers tend
to include new suppliers with whom they
have not previously transacted in the
auctions in order to increase competition (Emiliani, 2000; Smart and Harisson,
2003; Smeltzer and Carr, 2002, 2003; Wagner and Schwab, 2004).
Like any other auction (Bakos,1997;
McAfee and McMillan,1987), ORAs can
provide enhanced transparency in business relations (Carter et al., 2004; Wagner
and Schwab, 2004). This results in more
information being made available to suppliers, and reduces information-asymmetry for both groups of players (Smeltzer
and Carr, 2002; Jap, 2002; Emiliani, 2005).
ORAs can thus bring transparency to the
negotiation process (Caby-Guillet et al.,
2007) as well as greater price transparency (Soh and Markus, 2002; Soh et al.,
2006). However, Giampietro and Emiliani (2007) suggest that ORA use creates
one-way transparency since suppliers
gain little or no insights into the buying
firms. This may lead suppliers to feel
that buyers exert their power unfairly,
consequently damaging collaborative
relations, which may in turn lead to lost
opportunities for future joint initiatives,
or suppliers using retaliatory behavior in
response to perceived injustices (Emil-

iani and Stec, 2004; 2005; Jap, 2003; Tassabehji et al., 2006).
In addition, more upfront preparation
of ORAs by buyers compared to other
sourcing arrangements leads to a significant compression of cycle time, which is
even shorter for repeated auctions (Carter et al., 2004). They also compress sales
orders and RFQ (request for quotation)
cycle times, (Smart and Harrison, 2003).
This reduces transaction costs for both
buyers and suppliers (Daly and Nath,
2005).
Despite the above-mentioned incentives, both buyers and suppliers have experienced a number of challenges in their
use of ORAs. Buying firms report varying
returns on investment (Handfield et al.,
2002) and, in some cases, the price reductions obtained through ORAs have not
been large enough to cover the e-auction
service fees (Hannon, 2003). Indeed, some
authors have noted that the compressed
timeframe of open-bid auctions creates a
stressful context for suppliers. It prevents
them from carefully considering price
bids, giving them the feeling that they are
“out of control” (Jap 2003). Together with
the higher visibility and salience of competition in ORAs, it may even cause them
to make concessions – particularly at the
end of the bidding process – that go further than they had in mind at the outset
(Carter et al., 2004). Moreover, authors
such as Jap (2003) have suggested that
ORAs increase suppliers’ distrust of buying firms, since the open-bid process is
frequently considered as “exploitative and
unfair”. Consistent with this conjecture,
Smeltzer and Carr (2003) note that most
of their interviewees were concerned
with the negative impact that ORAs can
have on buyer–supplier relationships. Jap
(2003) concludes that the perception of
opportunism surrounding online reverse
auctions can seriously harm relationships
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between buyers and suppliers, and even
creates distrust (Charki and Josserand,
2008). Carter and Kauffman (2007) empirically showed that perceptions of opportunism decrease relationship trust and
purchaser commitment, which ultimately
leads to reduced supplier performance
in factors other than price (e.g. weak response to delivery problems and buyer
requests, no preferred access in times of
high demand, slow access to innovations,
and a lack of quality improvement initiatives).
Carter and his colleagues (2004) added
that the vast majority of suppliers in their
study reported adverse effects on their relationship with buyers following the introduction of ORAs. The complaints included
damage to such practices as collaborative
problem-solving, development of trusting long-term business relationships and
joint capability-development. In the same
vein, Tassabehji et al. (2006) found that
suppliers may perceive ORA adoption as
a sign that the buyers fail to take all their
previous investment, collaborative effort
and satisfaction provided in the past into
consideration. For Jap (2003), the suppliers felt that ORA called into question all
forms of partnership between the two
parties, to the extent that they complain
about an absence of fairness. Giampietro
and Emiliani (2007) advanced a related
concern regarding ORAs, observing that
words such as exploitative (Jap, 2001)
and coertion (Emiliani and Stec, 2005)
are common across the industry and academic literature with regard to how suppliers view ORAs.
Giving these problems related to ORAs
use and the extent to which buyers’ opportunism can be harmful to buyer-supplier relationships (Charki et al., 2011),
suppliers are now reluctant to use ORAs.
Indeed, many suppliers refuse to use
ORAs unless they are forced to do so by

buyers (Emiliani and Stec, 2005; Giampietro and Emiliani, 2007). This refusal can
become systematic and can even call the
use of ORAs into question, since in some
cases buyers have been obliged to cancel
the ORAs because of the lack of suppliers
willing to take part to the bidding (Boukef
et al., 2011).
As our discussion of the prevailing literature shows, advocates and opponents of
ORAs have constructed a number of arguments to explain their use. It also shows
that the existing literature largely focuses
on the perceived outcomes (enablers and
barriers) to explain buyers’ and suppliers’ use of ORAs. The IOS literature has
shown that both organizational capabilities and the interorganizational environment matter in explaining IOS use (Robey
et al., 2008; Kurnia and Johnston, 2000).
However, these two dimensions have not
been explored in the case of ORAs. In the
following section, we discuss the extent
to which organizational capabilities as
well as context of use matter from a theoretical standpoint in the case of IOS use.

2.3. Going beyond perceived outcomes as the main determinants
of ORA use: considering the role
of organizational capabilities and
context of use
2.3.1. Organizational capabilities
as a determinant of IOS use
IS researchers have acknowledged organizational capability as an enabler of IOS
use. This refers to the set of skills needed
to use an IT. For instance, in their extensive review of the IOS literature, Robey et
al. (2008) highlighted the role of organizational readiness to foster adoption, which
refers not only to the internal resources of
the firms studied, but also to those of its
13

Published by AIS Electronic Library (AISeL), 2016
07-37 Boukef.indd 13

7
12/07/16 17:27

Systèmes d'Information et Management, Vol. 21 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 2

SYSTÈMES D’INFORMATION ET MANAGEMENT

trading partners. This encompasses top
management commitment (Iacovou et
al., 1995; Premkumar et al., 1997; Robey et
al., 2008), availability of IT infrastructures
and trading partner experience. In another study, Kurnia and Johnston (2000)
pointed to different forms of organizational capabilities that foster adoption,
including top management commitment,
clear vision, competitiveness, adequate
education, communication openness, the
right selection of performance measures,
flexibility, and availability of an IT infrastructure.
However, in addition to the intrinsic
importance of organizational capability in
terms of IOS use, the focus cannot be restricted to the organizational capabilities
of a specific firm, but also need to include
those of the trading partners (Rai et al.,
2006; Baraldi et al., 2012). Indeed, procuring the expected benefits depends on
the trading partners’ willingness to adopt
the IOS as well as their own capabilities.
In effect, lack of cooperation between the
trading partners can compromise success (Bala and Venkatesh, 2007). Consequently, exploration of the role of the organizational capabilities of both the focal
firm and the trading partner is important
in the context of ORAs.
2.3.2. The role of the institutional
context in explaining IOS use
In addition to the role of organizational
capabilities, Robey et al. (2008) highlight
that of the external environment to explain IOS use, which includes “competitive pressure, government pressure, business partner power and support from the
initiator” (p.501). More specifically, research on IOS adoption has emphasized
the extent to which institutional factors
can promote adoption (Teo et al., 2003;
Bala and Venkatesh, 2007). For instance,

Teo et al. (2003) pointed to the extent to
which the institutional context influences
IOS adoption. They differentiate between
mimetic (“the extent of adoption by competitors and perceived success of adoption by competitors”, p.27), coercive
(“perceived dominance of supplier adopters, perceived dominance of customer
adopters and conformity with parent corporation’s practices”, p.27) and normative pressures (“the extent of existing IOS
adoption by an organization’s suppliers
and customers, and participation in professional trade and business bodies that
promote and disseminate information
on IOS adoption”, p.28). They demonstrate that normative pressures have the
most significant impact on predicting IOS
adoption. This can be explained by the
dominant role played by the government
and trade associations in encouraging
adoption. However, as Rodon et al. (2011)
argue, despite the institutions’ role in fostering IOS use, it is rare that an authority
promotes its acceptance and use. This
explains the relative freedom of users regarding the adoption or rejection of the
system. The adoption rate of IOS is very
slow and may be subject to rejection (Rajaguru and Matanda, 2013).
While research has acknowledged the
institutional context in determining IOS
use, it has not taken into account potential changes to this context and how these
may impact on use. The institutional context is subject to variation and IOS use
itself can lead to an institutional change
(Reimers et al., 2014). For instance, Rodon et al. (2011) demonstrated that IOS
use generates interventions that can modify either the users’ institutional context
or the institutional features of IOS, and
these interventions can foster IOS assimilation.
Taking such theoretical gaps into consideration, our paper contends that both

14
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organizational capabilities and the institutional context matter in explaining the
determinants (enablers and/or barriers)
of ORA use. More particularly, this paper
explores the extent to which organizational capabilities can either enhance or
hinder ORA use. We also investigate the
role played by the interorganizational
environment, notably in the light of the
institutional change that has had a significant impact on ORA use. Given the proliferation of opportunism fostered by ORAs,
the French government voted a law that
aimed to regulate its use. This legal intervention has undoubtedly had an impact
on ORA use.

case studies are used when “a priori fixed
relationships” exist (Dubé and Paré, 2003,
p.604). In our case, our literature review
showed that ORA use can not only be
explained by its perceived outcomes but
also indicated that organizational capabilities as well as institutional context matter.
Our qualitative approach aims to improve
our understanding of these determinants
of use given the specific context of use in
question. Indeed qualitative data is particularly rich and provide “thick descriptions” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p.10)
for a specific phenomenon embedded in
a context.

3.1. The case study context

METHODOLOGY
Consistent with the focus of our research, namely to understand the determinants of ORA use through the perspective of buyers and suppliers, and how a
change in the institutional context can
affect it, we conducted a positivist case
study (Benbasat et al., 1987; Dubé & Paré,
2003).
The case study methodology is well
adapted to our research question since
IOS is a phenomenon that is hard to separate from its environment (Reimers et al.,
2014). Moreover, a case study is a good
empirical research method for investigating complex phenomena since it gives us
a holistic understanding of real-life events
(Yin, 2013) and expounds relationships
involving multiple causal chains (Pettigrew, 1992). While case study research is
mainly used for exploration and hypothesis generation, it can also be used to provide explanations (Benbasat et al., 1987).
Case studies are indeed particularly suitable for how and why questions. Positivist

Single case studies are well accepted in
the IS literature (Dubé and Paré, 2003)
and have often been used for their capacity to provide in-depth understanding of
information systems as embedded in their
social context (Orlikowski and Iacono,
2001). We opted for a case of an under-investigated IOS in the IS field, namely,
online reverse auctions. We undertook
an in-depth case study in the context of
a leading French retail2 organization. The
retail industry provides an interesting
context as it has a long history of IOS use.
Our retailer was looking to understand its
buyers’ and suppliers’ interpretations and
meanings related to their experiences associated with ORA use. The retailer had a
challenging position in the French retail
industry and wanted to exploit the IOS in
order to gain a stronger competitive edge.
ORA use enables the retailer to reduce
the cost associated to the buying process
and thus to improve its margins. ORAs are
used to buy store brand products such as
toys, textile, do-it-yourself goods, outdoor
and garden-related goods. These prod-

For reasons of confidentiality and simplification, we will use the term ‘retailer’ to refer to the French retailer
that was the subject of our investigation

2
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ucts entail different degrees of innovation, however price is the main selection
criterion. The supplier who offers the best
price (i.e. the lowest price) at the end of
the auction wins the bid. Thus, the supplier selection is transparent and based
on price. This contrasts with other forms
of auction which are “buyer determined”
since the buyer has the right to select the
winner. This means that criteria other than
price can be taken into account (Jap and
Haruvy, 2008). Caby-Guillet et al. (2007)
mentioned some of the different types of
criteria that can influence the outcome of
the bidding event such as quality, quantity
and shipping conditions.

inform our research question. We conducted interviews with three groups of
informants: IT initiators (actors who took
part in the sourcing, initiation and influencing the sense-making of the IOS),
buyers (actors involved in the IOS use)
and suppliers (actors involved in the IOS
use).

Our key informant, the B2B projects
manager, played a major role in the study
since she was responsible for a relatively
new department whose mission was to
source new technologies that could support all the B2B processes linking the
retailer with its suppliers. In this case,
the B2B department had the mandate to
convince buyers, and thus suppliers, to
use the online reverse auction technology
that had reached the level of general deployment (Fichman and Kemerer (1997).
This corresponds to a state where a new
IS is used substantially. Indeed, ORAs support the entire suppliers’ selection process, and most buyers and suppliers use
them.

Our approach was also influenced by
Lamb and Kling’s (2003) work, which indicates the need to develop a new vision of
the user as an active social actor who negotiates the technology’s use and, at the
same time, is shaped by complex changes
in the environmental settings and organizational structures. Consequently, we
took into consideration a significant institutional change that occurred though
the enactment of a new law designed to
influence the use of ORAs. The new legislation sought to regulate business relationships between suppliers and retailers
taking part in ORAs, mainly because of the
several reported instances of unethical
use. In effect, despite the initial promises,
the literature is full of examples of unethical ORA use. These include allowing
unqualified suppliers to use the system or
running falsified auctions where buyers
or market-makers pretend to be suppliers in order to drive down the prices of
genuine, reliable suppliers (see notably
the work of Emiliani (2005) and Charki
et al. (2011) for a complete review of the
main ethical irregularities associated with
ORA use). Thus, the French government
voted the first legal intervention in June
2005, known as the Dutreil law (Official Journal of the Republic of France n°
179, 3rd August, 2005 page 12639, NOR:
PMEX0500079L).

Our key interlocutor helped us to identify appropriate interviewees who could

In view of this major change and the role
that the institutional perspective can play

ORAs are hosted in the B2B marketplace which is a consortium. During data
collection, the name of the platform was
Agentrics. It has changed since then to
become Neogrid.3 The B2B marketplace
offers numerous supply chain services
such as integration and planning and replenishment.

3

https://www.neogrid.com/uk
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in the use of a technology (Swanson and
Ramiller, 1997), we decided to conduct a
complementary study in order to discern
the extent to which such institutional
changes may influence buyers’ and suppliers’ interpretations of their use of an IOS.
The following section describes our data
collection method and its rationale.

3.2. Data collection & analysis
We used the interview guide approach
(Patton, 2002) to conduct our interviews
with all of our informants during the two
phases of the study. The first phase lasted
14 months (from April 2005 to June 2006),
while the second phase lasted 8 months
(from April to December 2008). The interview guide was tailored to match the
profiles of the different stakeholders. Our
focus throughout the interviews was to
understand the enablers and barriers to
ORA use.4
Most of the interviews were conducted
in French. Three interviews in the first
phase and one interview in the second
phase were conducted in English. All of
the interviews lasted between 30 minutes
and 2 hours and 15 minutes. In total, we
conducted 122 semi-structured interviews, sixty-seven interviews during the
first phase and fifty-five during the second
data collection phase.5 Our focus was on
buyer and supplier enablers and barriers
to use (e.g. why they use ORAs, what are
their main motivations for using ORAs,
what stops them from using ORAs, etc.).
Interviews with the IT initiators gave us
further insights into the context of use as
well as the determinants of use for both
buyers and suppliers.

Data analyses proceeded in several
stages. First, and in line with the recommendations by Eisenhardt and Bourgeois
(1988), we transcribed each interview
as verbatim to increase the reliability of
our data. This amounted to 750 pages of
script from the first data collection stage
and 689 pages from the second stage, enabling us to perform a meticulous analysis of the use of ORAs by different stakeholders, paying particular attention to the
context of use and the extent to which
the latter may influence use. We then conducted a qualitative and thematic analysis
of the interview data with the help of the
N-vivo statistical software program (Richards 1999).
Data iterations enabled us to generate
original findings. In line with recommendations by Miles and Huberman (1994), we
examined each text comprehensively, line
by line, in order to become familiar with
the different ways in which informants
interpreted ORAs and the factors that influenced ORA use. We grouped our codes
into three themes (perceived outcomes,
capabilities and new enablers, and barriers
to ORA use resulting from the new law).
Our codes were derived either from the
existing IS literature or were emergent
from our data. Since we used semi-structured interviews, the interviewees were
able to express themselves freely, providing us with unexpected findings. Our
coding6 relied on an extensive additional
literature review regarding IOS use and
ORA use in particular (e.g., see Carter et
al. 2004; Jap 2002, 2003, 2007; Tassabehji et
al. 2006), and also gave rise to some unexpected findings and nuances related to the
enablers and barriers to ORA use, which
in turn improved our understanding. For

See appendix A for the interview guides.
See appendix B for detailed information on our sampling logic
6
See appendix C for further details in our coding.
4
5
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instance, we had not considered the role
of the law in dissuading buyers from using
ORAs. Consequently, our results emerged
from successive iterations between the
data and existing IOS literature.
We also used matrix displays to highlight differences between buyer and supplier enablers and barriers to use (Miles
and Huberman, 1994). These matrixes
were particularly useful in improving our
understanding of the differences and similarities that characterize buyer and supplier enablers and barriers.
We were not only interested in the
presence or absence of coding categories, but also in the relationships between
these categories and the extent to which
a change in the institutional context can
impact on use.

4. RESULTS
We first showed the extent to which
perceived outcomes that explain ORA
use differ between buyers and suppliers.
We then highlighted the role of capabilities as a determinant of ORA use. More
particularly, we identified a dichotomy in
terms of the implications of capabilities
between buyers and suppliers. We found
that while buyers use ORAs in order to
leverage their capabilities, suppliers are
obliged to renounce some of their competitive capabilities, which constitutes a
barrier to ORA use. Finally, we highlighted
the extent to which a change in the institutional context can negatively influence
ORA use. At the same time as it failed to
overcome the barrier created by buyers’
opportunism, the main factor behind the
climate of distrust, it created a new barrier
to ORA use for buyers due to the controls
and sanctions imposed.

4.1. Different perceived outcomes between buyers and suppliers
While transparency is a determinant for
both buyers and suppliers in ORA use,
our results illustrate different perceived
outcomes between the two partners that
can either motivate or deter them from
opting to use ORAs.
4.1.1. Transparency perceived by
both buyers and suppliers
Both the buyers and the suppliers we
interviewed considered that ORAs can
help to enhance transparency. Indeed,
the visibility of all the bids by suppliers
provides better transparency in the negotiation process, promoting the perception of fairness, as indicated by one IT
initiator: “the main consequence of ORA
use is better transparency and improved
equity.” Buyers argued that transparency
has the advantage of erasing any suspicion
of favoritism from the relationship: “ORAs
have the advantage of showing suppliers
that we’re not favoring one supplier at
the expense of another… everyone can
see the extent to which the others are
able to make a proposal.” This view was
confirmed by suppliers, since ORA use
gives them all the same opportunity to
win the bid without any consideration for
existing buyer-supplier relationships, as
the following supplier pointed out: “one
of the advantages of ORAs is that we are
all equal, we all have our chance to win
the bid.” Following the same reasoning,
another supplier added: “Our policy is
to take part in ORAs since they are very
effective for suppliers in terms of discovering the winning bid and so making
negotiations more transparent.” Thus,
transparency was at times interpreted as
synonymous with enhanced equity in the
interorganizational relationships: “Equity
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and neutrality are two of the main motivations behind engaging in electronic
marketplaces” one electronic marketplace informant acknowledged.
This transparency enables both buyers
and suppliers to concentrate on objective criteria in the negotiation process,
as highlighted by the following buying
manager: “the main point of using ORAs
is the transparency of the negotiation by
eliminating all subjective criteria and
concentrating only on objective ones.”
However, some suppliers were suspicious
of the claimed advantage of transparency
because of the risk of inappropriate use
when unreliable suppliers were invited,
as suggested by the following supplier:
“if you get suppliers to take part only to
reduce prices, I wouldn’t call that better
transparency” (Supplier).
4.1.2. Buyers discover real prices
and enlarge their sourcing horizons, but also come up against unexpected barriers
Our data shows that ORAs supposedly
enable buyers to discover suppliers’ ‘real’
prices, in other words, the real optimal
price that the supplier can accept, while
achieving an optimal return. As one buyer
stated: “the auction lets us see how far
a supplier is able to reduce his price.”
Another buyer added: “it’s always interesting to see how much a supplier can
lower bids during the bidding event.”
Still, the same transparency can also lead
to resentment if buyers discover that suppliers have not been offering their best
prices in the past: “We’ve been working
with the same manufacturer for 15 years
and we thought we were buying at competitive prices.”
At the same time, as the following interviewee notes, ORAs allow buyers to enlarge their sourcing horizons: “ORAs help

us to widen our sourcing horizons. They
offer us more flexibility in terms of choice
of suppliers” (Buyer). Moreover, they
enable buyers to streamline their buying process by avoiding multiple rounds
of traditional face-to-face negotiations:
“ORAs are a tool that allows buyers to
free up time from the mechanical aspect
of negotiations so they can focus more
on added-value activities.” Some buyers
told us that ORAs are used to ensure that
their suppliers continue to work on their
competitiveness by making them aware
of their competitors’ capacity to reduce
prices: “Setting up ORAs means we can
give some suppliers wake-up calls and
see the extent to which they are really
willing to continue working with us…
It makes suppliers aware of the industry
realities and helps them to judge whether
they are still competitive.”
However, alongside these incentives
and benefits, our data analysis unexpectedly revealed some barriers that stopped
buyers from engaging in and contributing
to ORAs. As the ORA system determines
the winning suppliers, some buyers
feared losing control over the purchasing process: “Some buyers refuse to use
ORAs because they don’t like the idea of
losing control over deal allocation decisions. In fact, with ORAs it’s no longer
the buyer who decides, but the market.”
Another interviewee said that despite the
improved performance that ORAs can offer buyers, the latter might not want to
use the system as it could be perceived
as a competitor calling into question
the buyer’s previous negotiation performance: “Generally, buyers don’t like to
be in competition with another system
that generates better results, even if it’s
a machine.” Some of the suppliers attributed the lack of motivation to the buyers’
wish to control the negotiation process by
deciding on the supplier(s) they prefer to
19
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work with: “Buyers know that they may
have to deal with suppliers they don’t
like. ORAs take away their ability to decide.” Paradoxically, buyers may also fear
a deterioration in their purchasing performance: “Surprisingly, some buyers call
their suppliers during the bidding and
try to make them bid around the same
amount they quoted in the past in traditional negotiations… They’re afraid that
their managers will think that they failed
to achieve the same performance in the
past…” (Supplier).
4.1.3. Opportunities to penetrate
new markets and suppliers’ concerns about buyers’ opportunism
From the suppliers’ perspective, we
found that those who come in as challengers are particularly keen to use ORAs
since they view the IOS as an opportunity
to penetrate new markets and benchmark themselves with incumbents. As
one buyer representative argued: “I think
that the greatest advantage of ORAs for
suppliers is the ability to penetrate new
markets, especially as the traditional
way is generally long for challengers.”
Suppliers confirmed this: “Initially, ORAs
[…] enabled us to penetrate the retailer’s
market.” Moreover, other supplier representatives pointed to the benefits associated with benchmarking: “ORAs can help
us to benchmark with competitors… If
our bid is too far from the winning bid,
we review our processes and practices.”
However, suppliers may also hesitate to
use ORAs, among other things because
of the proliferation of opportunism associated with ORA use by certain buyers.
In this regard, a buyer representative advanced: “Some of my suppliers told me
that they wouldn’t take part in future
ORAs… Unethical behavior by others has
made them suspicious of this technol-

ogy.” These unethical practices include
phantom or shill bidding, for example,
as illustrated by the following supplier’s
comment: “some suppliers took part in
the bidding event just to force other suppliers to reduce their bids… This can
lead to distrust, especially if it’s used systematically.” Other opportunistic buyer
activities involve bluff during the ORAs by
inviting unreliable suppliers: “The buyer
can bluff in a classic negotiation and he
can totally bluff in ORAs… usually the
other buyers invite all potential suppliers but the thing is that they don’t play in
the same category as me. I’ve used ORAs
where some suppliers should never have
been there” (Supplier). We also found evidence that some buyers can use ORAs
just to compare the prices of suppliers
with no intention of awarding them any
business, as suggested by the following
remark from a supplier representative:
“Some ORAs were cancelled for reasons
we never discovered…the buyer just
wanted to find out about market trends.”
Other suppliers revealed further forms
of unethical behavior, such as when buyers disturb the online bidding event if the
outcome is not going in their favor. This
is illustrated by the following quote from
one supplier’s account manager: “Often
the buyer calls during the bidding event
to put undue pressure on the suppliers...
He/she calls saying: “I don’t understand,
you didn’t bid and you risk losing the
deal...” This can destabilize the suppliers.
We mustn’t forget though that it’s not a
casino game and behind it there are factories with jobs, so we can’t bid just anything to win. Lots of buyers do this and
it puts pressure on suppliers during the
auction.”
The extent of such opportunism has
strengthened suppliers’ belief that ORAs
are uniquely in the economic interest of
buyers, destroying producers’ margins

20

http://aisel.aisnet.org/sim/vol21/iss1/2
07-37 Boukef.indd 20

14
12/07/16 17:27

Boukef et al.: Understanding Online Reverse Auction Determinants of Use: A Multi
UNDERSTANDING ONLINE REVERSE AUCTION DETERMINANTS OF USE: A MULTI-STAKEHOLDER CASE STUDY

and even putting their survival at risk,
as suggested by the following supplier:
“ORAs kill companies; we can’t build a
firm’s strategy with ORAs. There’s no trust.
Cost is the only driver. We’re really afraid
that ORAs will destabilize the market.”
This has led to suspicion and distrust, seriously weakening a keystone of business
relationships, as suggested by this supplier representative: “I think that ORAs
interfere with communication. They
destroy confidence, and create mistrust
and suspicion.” Buyers acknowledged
the legitimacy of suppliers’ concerns following abuses that sometimes had a dramatic economic impact on businesses. “I
mainly work with small and medium international companies; they’re very worried whenever we mention ORAs…I can
understand why they’re afraid…”
Given the extent of this opportunism
and its dramatic impact on their margins,
suppliers became reluctant to take part in
ORAs, as one supplier indicated: “I don’t
like ORAs, we don’t want to take part
anymore because of all the abuses we’ve
spoken about…” This refusal affected all
retailers, whether they used ORAs opportunistically or not: “I won’t take part in
ORAs again whoever the host retailer is.”
Some buyers confirmed this refusal by
suppliers to use ORAs, as in the following
quote: “we sometimes have suppliers refusing to take part in ORAs for economic
or ethical reasons.”

4.2. Capabilities are determinant
of ORA use for both buyers and
suppliers
Our analysis shows that buyers and suppliers who previously met for face-to-face
negotiations had to develop new skills in
order to use ORAs efficiently. In fact, this
was one of the ORA coordinator’s main responsibilities: “I’m responsible for training

and assistance, and I have to help buyers
to use ORAs in a way that matches their
procurement needs.” This corresponded
to the opinion of a manager from the IT
department who acknowledged that: “using ORAs requires a new relationship
management methodology.”
Our analysis thus indicates that ORA use
requires specific capabilities for buyers,
while suppliers have to renounce some of
their capabilities, constituting a barrier to
ORA use.
4.2.1. Buyers need to develop their
ORA capabilities
Buyer representatives, for example, had
to develop the capacity to select a larger
number of reliable suppliers that were able
to honor their bids ex-post, rather than
narrowing down the number of suppliers
after organizing ‘beauty-contests’ and engaging in intensive partner selection processes. When buyers do not develop such
skills, suppliers are less inclined to submit a bid: “If the buyer invites suppliers
without being selective, that bothers me.”
Another supplier confirmed this: “If I can
trust the selection process, I won’t have
any problem negotiating with buyers
in ORAs, but the problem is that buyers
don’t go through this process adequately
each time.” Buyers themselves also recognized the need to select suppliers carefully prior to the bidding stage. Some of
them, however, admitted that they did
not have the resources to systematically
audit suppliers before bidding: “I don’t
have time to visit all my suppliers and
audit their capabilities… It takes a lot of
time and money.”
In addition, engaging in ORAs means
buyers need to improve their ability to
write and develop precise and meticulous
Requests for Quotations (RFQs) to ensure
that their interpretations concerning the
21
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goods to be purchased are aligned with
those of the prospective suppliers. As one
supplier said: “The ORA process must be
fully grasped […], notably through the development of meticulous RFQs.” Similarly,
the ORA coordinator noted the importance of beefing-up buyers’ capabilities in
this domain, a crucial skill for the system to
be used appropriately: “If the buyer can’t
develop a professional RFQ, then products
can’t be compared and consequently we
can’t initiate ORAs… Buyers must become
a lot more professional… In effect, if they
can’t write meticulous RFQs, suppliers
won’t be able to take part in ORAs, since
the products will be incomparable.”
Moreover, the buying firm and the market-maker (electronic marketplace (EMP))
in this study had to develop several other
resources, such as e-sourcing technologies and supplier databases that could be
shared among their subsidiaries and client organizations respectively. The latter
allowed them to unleash the potential of
new and competitive suppliers. One buyer
representative remarked on this aspect:
“With ORAs and sourcing technologies, we
can consider more and more suppliers
so as to anticipate markets and trends.”
In the same line of reasoning, the person
responsible for B2B from the IT initiator
group spoke of the importance of improving buyers’ sourcing capabilities: “Some
buyers have told me they can’t use ORAs
because they only have two suppliers...
Then I explain that we have resources
such as databases and e-sourcing that
can help them to select new suppliers…
Buyers can also call our offices in Asia.”
4.2.2. Suppliers have to renounce to
some of their capabilities
On the supplier side, our data analysis
revealed that they were unhappy with the
way that the use of the ORA system af-

fected and even called into question their
key capabilities. Various capability-related
issues emerged with respect to the group
of suppliers. First, they consider that ORAs
prevent them from leveraging their ability
to negotiate win-win deals or to innovate
or respond quickly to buyers’ requests:
“compared to foreign suppliers – the
Chinese for instance – I can react more
quickly… The boat needs six weeks from
China, while I can react within 24 hours
or one week. How do you assess my flexibility in ORAs? How do you evaluate all
the effort, services and investment that
I’ve made over the last couple of years?
How do you assess all the time that we’ve
spent working on the packaging and resolving problems in order to satisfy our
buyers? At the end of the day, ORAs penalize us...” In similar vein, suppliers feel
that the use of ORAs reduces their ability
to add value since they destroy all value
drivers and limit their scope for negotiation with buyers to the sole criterion of
price. This is illustrated by the following
quote: “I try to help the buyer save money
through product improvements, better
category management, merchandising,
market analysis, promotion and consulting, not just by reducing my prices.”
Suppliers also felt that other capabilities
and resources, such as R&D, product and
process development, innovation, and advice and services, had become less important or even redundant. They sometimes
felt as if the use of ORAs limited their role
to simply clicking the mouse. One supplier summed it up as follows: “There’s no
advantage in ORA use … I don’t see any
advantage in destroying jobs and economic opportunities… With the leap in
raw material prices, please tell me how
we can manage this situation with reduced margins… One solution might be
to make us downsize, stop R&D activities,
or even send jobs overseas to cut payroll
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costs.” Existing suppliers also felt that they
had to compete against newcomers with
less expertise, notably in terms of quality
standards: “They can include us in the
same ORA as other, small foreign suppliers… However, as a multinational company, we respect stringent quality standards, certifications and controls.”
Suppliers further consider the use of
ORAs as harmful since they reduce personal contact with buyer representatives.
This de-socialization prevents suppliers from practicing their advisory role
and makes them feel that their capabilities have become useless. The following
quote from a supplier explains how suppliers typically feel about their capabilities: “There’s no relationship anymore,
it’s completely impersonal… You’re in
front of your screen watching the price
drop… The business relationship is reduced to its simplest expression.” Another
supplier regretted the extent to which the
use of ORAs has destroyed suppliers’ ability to mobilize their capabilities to create
added value for the buyer: “ORAs eliminate all discussion with buyers. We no
longer speak about products, only about
the minimal specifications written in the
RFQ that we have to stick to… It’s like
when we sell a car: the buyer says that
he/she only needs a car, an engine and
four wheels. That’s all. ORAs kill suppliers’ creativity and suggestions, although
I think that it’s the main part of my job
as a supplier… In fact, I can suggest innovations to buyers thanks to my expertise. The problem is that the door is now
closed to all suggestions.”
In addition to the differences in terms
of capabilities between buyers and suppliers, the change in the institutional context played a significant role in shaping
determinants of use.
7

4.3. New institutional context
with different impact on buyer
and supplier determinants of use
Many buyer and supplier representatives in our study initially had significant
doubts about ORAs, stemming from different objectives, ambiguity and uncertainty
surrounding the system. In response
to these concerns and the discovery of
fraudulent behavior, the French legislator
enacted the first law in the world to govern the use of ORA technology. This law
and the institutions designated to enforce
it influenced the stakeholders’ incentive
to use ORAs, as the two factors led to a reduction in abusive behaviors. Application
of the law is undertaken by public agencies that have the power to monitor practices, either systematically or at the specific request of suppliers. Moreover, to facilitate controls, the law obliges buyers to
record all bidding processes for one year:
“The buyer or the person organizing the
auction registers the auction process and
stores the data for a period of one year.
This must be presented in the event of an
investigation conducted under the conditions set out in section 5 of the commercial code” (article L.442.10.2).
Consequently, any party found guilty of
making false claims, introducing phantom
suppliers, or using unauthorized means
to disrupt the transparency of ORAs now
risks paying a high price.7 The existence
of such sanctions has forced users to be
more careful when it comes to ORAs, as
one supplier told us: “There’s a high risk
of controls and the penalties are considerable, which makes users very wary of
this law.” This was confirmed by the following buyer: “Controls are now written
into the law and they are extremely constraining for buyers. We’re really con-

Up to two years in prison and fines of up to €30,000 ($44,124).
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cerned about them. If we have problems
with suppliers, they can ask for an investigation to be carried out…” (Buyer). Another interviewee commented: “The introduction of the new law also increased
stakeholders’ ability to use ORAs, since it
rendered the nature of the game and its
rules much clearer.” In essence, the law
increased buyers and suppliers’ mutual
awareness and understanding of what is
and is not allowed when using ORAs.
Still, the new law has different implications for buyers and suppliers, and this
influences their use of ORAs differently.
Indeed, while, the law did not do enough
to remove the barriers of opportunism for
suppliers and thus failed to deal with their
reluctance to use ORAs, it created new barriers for buyers through the tough controls
and sanctions that dissuaded them from
using ORAs, despite the economic gains
they could expect from its use.
4.3.1. Failure to address distrust
The legal system was slow to react when
buyers’ opportunistic use of ORAs was first
detected. Instead, intervention occurred
once the opportunism had already become relatively widespread and had led
to general distrust and suspicion. By this
time, it was hard to eradicate the negative outcomes of ORA use, as this buyer
suggested: “I’m sorry that the law was
passed so long after the start of ORA use.
They caused a lot of damage and suppliers have such a negative image of the tool
that it’s hard now to undo the harm.” This
is particularly true as suppliers lack confidence in the law’s ability to prevent opportunism related to ORA use despite the
tough controls and penalties imposed on
buyers. Suppliers argue that because of the
asymmetry of power with buyers, it is very
hard to apply the law. They are reluctant
to take buyers to court in the case of sus-

pected opportunism, as they are worried
about its impact on their business. The
following supplier explained his unwillingness to confront buyers: “no one will take
retailers to court; we can’t do it because
of the imbalance of power between buyers
and suppliers, they’re too powerful…” Another supplier added: “…it’s too risky for
us to (take buyers to court), no one would
want to work with us anymore…”
This distrust of the law is intensified by
the suppliers’ conviction that buyers can
get round the legal hurdles. The following supplier pointed out: “the results from
ORAs were globally negative…the big retailers’ legal departments know the law
very well and the extent to which they
can get away with it…I don’t want to use
ORAs and have a bad experience anymore…” This resentment is confirmed by
buyers. As one buyer put it: “we can easily get round the law. However, we need
to be very cautious.”
4.3.2. Risk of controls and sanctions: new barriers to buyers’ use
of ORAs
Unexpectedly, the introduction of the
new law led to a reduction in ORA use. By
introducing tougher controls and severe
penalties (fines and imprisonment), the
law made ORA use more complex, consequently reducing take-up of the technology since buyers were increasingly reluctant to use the tool, as the following interviewee indicated: “all these regulations
increase the risk. We do all we can to
avoid it, since using ORAs increases the
chances of being controlled. So we use
fewer ORAs to avoid the risk…ORAs are
now highly controlled with a real risk of
penalties that people try to get round…”
(Buyer).
Thus, while ORA use can help buyers
to make large savings, the risks related to
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controls and penalties outweigh the expected economic gains. Buyers thus prefer not to use ORAs so as to avoid the related risk, as highlighted by the following
IT initiator: “The introduction of the law
was a serious slap in the face and gave
us a lot more worries…in other words,
using IT in this case meant greater risk
of being investigated…so the less you use
ORAs, the less risk there is of controls” (IT
initiator). Thus, buyers renounced potential gains as they preferred to avoid the
risk of being controlled.
Despite the perceived gains emanating
from ORAs, the increased complexity introduced by the law curbed buyers’ enthusiasm due to the risk of controls and

penalties, dissuading them from using the
IT: “the law has increased the inhibitors
of ORA use…” (Buyer). This led to a drop
in ORA use, as confirmed by the suppliers: “we are certainly invited to fewer
auctions compared to previous years.”
Our results are summarized in Table 1.

DISCUSSION
Given our research question: “What are
the determinants of ORA use in terms of
enablers and barriers from the vantage
point of buyers and suppliers, and how
can a change in the institutional context
affect its use,” our initial findings tend to

Buyer

Supplier
Transparency

Improved buyer performance
Extended sourcing horizons

Opportunity to penetrate
new markets
Benchmarking against competitors

Fear of losing control over
the purchasing process
Competition with the system

Buyer’s opportunism

Capabilities

Buyers need to develop new
capabilities in order to use
ORAs. This includes supplier selection and writing
RFQs as well as e-sourcing
technologies and supplier
databases.

Unlike buyers, suppliers
cannot use some of their
competitive capabilities
such as innovation, R&D,
or reactivity to the buyers’
needs.

Impact of the law
on use

The law is at the origin of
new barriers that dissuade
buyers from using ORAs.
The risk of controls and penalties imposed by the law
outweighs perceived advantages, resulting in a reduction in ORA use.

Enablers
Perceived
outcomes
Barriers

The law failed to remove existing barriers to use related
to opportunistic behaviors
that were at the origin of the
climate of distrust.

Table 1: Summary of the results: determinants of ORA use
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support the literature on the main determinants of ORAs. In effect, we found that
better economic performance (Williams
and Dobie, 2011) and wider sourcing
horizons (Daly and Nath, 2005) were the
main drivers for buyers, while new market penetration (Smeltzer and Carr, 2003)
was the most important enabler for suppliers. In the same vein, our results support initial findings in the literature about
the degree to which opportunistic behavior, committed mainly on the buying side,
influenced suppliers’ motivation to stop
using the system (Tassabehji et al., 2006).
In effect, abusive use of ORAs called into
question the expected advantages promised to suppliers, such as transparency
and access to industrial benchmarks. We
contribute to the IS literature by illustrating the crucial role of organizational capabilities in determining ORA use. We also
highlight the extent to which a change in
the institutional context can impact on
use by unexpectedly creating new barriers. Finally, we point to the role of perceived risk emanating from the law that
triggered discontinuance of ORA use by
buyers.
The IOS literature indicates the degree
to which the organizational readiness of
the focal firm (buyer) should evolve to
meet the new capabilities needed in terms
of IT sophistication (Chwelos et al., 2001).
Thus, new capabilities for wider sourcing
of suppliers and greater ability to develop
meticulous Requests for Quotation were
considered important in enhancing organizational capabilities in the buyers’ use of
ORAs. However, while the IOS literature
finds that the organizational readiness of
the trading partner (suppliers in our context) also needs to be improved to meet
new IOS expectations (see the comprehensive literature review by Robey, Im
and Wareham (2008)), we found that suppliers considered that ORA use had neg-

ative implications on their capabilities.
Thus, the adoption of an IOS that reverberates negatively on suppliers’ economic
performance is perceived by the latter as
a hindrance to their innovative skills, and
R&D and customer satisfaction become
redundant since their buyers fail to take
their capabilities into consideration, viewing price as the sole selection criterion.
We contribute to the IOS literature by
identifying the extent to which partners
may have different needs in terms of capabilities. More particularly, we show that
IOS use does not necessarily imply an organizational improvement, but may also
be associated with the renouncement of
some strategic capabilities, constituting a
barrier to ORA use.
Research on IOS adoption has emphasized the extent to which institutional
factors can promote adoption (Teo et al.,
2003; Bala and Venkatesh, 2007). However, little is known about the extent to
which a change in the institutional context may impact on use. Indeed, IOS are
institutional context change enablers (Reimers et al., 2014). More particularly, IOS
can be at the origin of interventions that
transform the institutional context (Rodon
et al., 2011). Rodon et al. (2011) demonstrated that by changing the institutional
context, an intervention can foster IOS
use, thereby achieving its initial aim. Unlike Rodon et al. (2011) who examine the
case of an intervention adopted to promote IOS routinization, our study examines an intervention designed to regulate
use by preventing opportunism through
controls and sanctions. Our findings show
that in this specific case, the law failed to
remove the barriers that constrained suppliers’ use of ORAs, and unexpectedly created new barriers that limited buyers’ use
of the technology. We thus contribute to
the IS literature by showing the extent to
which a change in the institutional con-
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text can impact on determinants of use
by creating new barriers. This confirms
the crucial role played by the institutional
context in fostering IOS adoption (Teo et
al., 2003; Bala and Venkatesh, 2007), not
only at the outset, but also in later stages
since it can affect the determinants of use.
However, we may question the relevance
of institutional intervention in regulating
IT use and the extent to which controls
and sanctions can be dissuasive when it
comes to dealing with opportunism. Indeed, the controls and sanctions introduced by the law unexpectedly triggered
IT discontinuance. Thus, since the government is facing increasing challenges
with regard to widespread digitalization,
the question of the effectiveness of its intervention is highly relevant, as is the efficacy of its related mechanisms.
To date, IS research has tended to focus
on expected IT performance or perceived
benefits to explain the use of IOS (Venkatesh et al., 2012). Such use can evolve
over time however (Jasperson et al.,
2005). Users continually revise their initial
expectations as they gain experience with
an IT, which they then confirm or discard.
Intention to continue using an IT is thus
based on continual comparison between
IT usage and expected outcomes, which
leads to either disconfirmation or satisfaction (Bhattacherjee and Premkumar,
2004). Our findings indicate that both
buyers and suppliers showed reluctance
to continue using the technology, leading
to some degree of ORA discontinuance.
With the two exceptions of Bhattacherjee (2001), who investigated discontinuance at individual level, and Furneaux
and Wade (2011), who examined it at organizational level, IT discontinuance has
largely been overlooked in the IS literature. For Furneaux and Wade (2011), the
decision to discontinue at organizational
level is made rationally, based on the dis-

crepancy between expectations regarding
the IT in use and its capabilities. Little is
known about the factors that explain the
discontinuance of interorganizational systems (IOS) since most of the related research has focused on adoption (Teo et
al., 2003; Hart and Saunders, 1997) and
its subsequent outcomes (Robey et al.,
2008). Despite their contribution, Furneaux and Wade’s (2011) research offers a
one-sided perspective that only provides
a partial understanding of IOS discontinuance, since at least two and sometimes
more companies are involved in IOS use
(Bala and Venkatesh, 2007). Our study
thus contributes to the existing literature
by giving further insights into IOS discontinuance. We demonstrate that the
gap between IT characteristics and user
expectations (Furneaux and Wade, 2011)
partially explains ORA discontinuance.
We also identify other triggers that affect
both buyers and suppliers. More particularly, we show the extent to which buyers’ opportunism can trigger suppliers’
discontinuance, since users can deflect
its application through their ongoing interaction with the technology (Griffith,
1999). Moreover, we demonstrate that
even though the ORA design is largely
in favor of buyers, some of them have
surprisingly decided to stop using the
technology. This discontinuance can be
explained by the perceived risks related
to ORA use due to control mechanisms
and penalties that outweigh the expected
benefits in our case. By regulating the use
of ORAs, the legislator introduced controls and tough sanctions, creating new
risks that outweigh the supposed gains
to be had from embracing ORAs. Thus,
even though the IT features correspond
to user expectations (Furneaux and Wade,
2011), and buyers are generally satisfied
with the outcomes of their use of ORAs
(Bhattacherjee and Prekumar, 2004),
some have decided to stop holding them
27
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in view of the risks brought about by
changes to the institutional context.
Few studies have looked at the role
of perceived risk that may curb initial
adoption (Featherman and Pavlou, 2003;
Pavlou, 2003). Featherman and Pavlou
(2003) showed the extent to which “performance-based risk perceptions” can
deter initial adoption in the context of
e-commerce. This performance-based
risk reflects the product’s failure to deliver the expected performance. In the
present paper, we examine the perceived
risk of a transgressor (buyer) paying a
high price through controls and sanctions imposed by the law in the case of
IT misuse. We thus contribute to the IS
literature by demonstrating the extent to
which perceived risk constitutes a barrier
to IT use, offsetting user satisfaction and
even leading to discontinuance.

CONCLUSION
Our study makes several contributions
to the IS literature. Along with previous
studies (e.g., Venkatesh and Bala, 2008),
we show the limitations of studying a focal
firm to understand IOS use. Since the latter
is embedded in a network of relationships
with different partners, it is important to
have a multi-stakeholder perspective when
examining adoption and use. We demonstrate the need to take the perspectives
of both buyers and suppliers on board in
order to understand the determinants of
IOS use from the vantage point of the focal
firm as well as the trading partner. In effect, focusing on the focal firm alone offers
only partial understanding of the enablers
and barriers to ORA use.
While IS research tends to focus on required capabilities that facilitate IOS use
(Chwelos et al., 2001, Robey et al., 2008;
Rai and Tang, 2010), we show that having

to renounce capabilities also constitutes
a barrier to ORA use. Thus, we urge researchers to examine not only the organizational capabilities needed for IS use, but
also those that may be abandoned.
Our study gives further insights into the
role of the institutional context in that it
can influence determinants of use by creating new barriers which actually inhibit
IT use. We show the extent to which the
risks related to sanctions and controls imposed by this institutional context constitute a barrier to use and can potentially
trigger ORA discontinuance.
To conclude, our results provide valuable insights into ORA use that go beyond
the perceived outcomes of ORAs by considering both organizational capabilities
and changes in the institutional context.
Unlike previous studies (e.g., Rodon et
al., 2011), we show that intervention can
have unexpected outcomes and can even
lead to IT discontinuance. Moreover, our
findings indicate the need to consider IT
discontinuance in other ways than simply
through the lens of the disconfirmation
of expected outcomes (Bhattacherjee and
Premkumar, 2004), since we identified
two other forms of IT discontinuance.
The first was triggered by the opportunistic behavior of buyers, while the second is
related to perceived risk subsequent to a
new law being introduced.
Our study also has some limitations
however. Controls and sanctions imposed
by the law are more compelling than
other forms of intervention. This explains
the extent to which such related risks can
outweigh the perceived benefits of an IT
use. This risk may not be as dissuasive in
the case of other forms of intervention.
Future research could examine the extent
to which other types of intervention may
impact on determinants of use. Generally,
IS research has focused on the impact of a
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single intervention. Following the recommendations of Jasperson et al. (2005), we
urge future researchers to examine the
impact of a range of forms of intervention
on the determinants of use.
From a managerial perspective, managers should pay careful attention to the
potential threat arising from any perceived IT-related risk since it might hinder IT use should the cost of using the
system outweigh the initially anticipated
benefits. Moreover, managers need to be
dissuasive when introducing regulations
designed to deal with abusive use. In this
sense, research has shown the limitations
of codes of conduct used to tackle opportunism, as they are restricted to the
enunciation of general and non-binding
statements which fail to discourage users
from abusing the IT (Harrington, 1996;
Bush et al., 2010). Thus, careful consideration should be given to the introduction of controls and penalty mechanisms
since, while they can be dissuasive as we
showed in this paper, they may simultaneously have unexpected outcomes and
lead to IT discontinuance when their perceived inconveniences eclipse the perceived benefits.
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE
IT initiators

Buyers

Suppliers

Could you explain the
reasons you put forward to convince buyers and suppliers to use
ORAs?

Why do you use ORAs?
What are you looking for when you use
ORAs?

Why do you use ORAs?
What are you looking for when you use
ORAs?

ORA use
barriers

How do you interpret Have you faced or have
the problems related to you heard about any
ORA use?
problems related to
ORA use?
How do you interpret
the problems? How can
these problems impact
on your use of ORAs?
Why?

Have you faced or have
you heard about any
problems related to
ORA use?
How do you interpret
these problems? How
can these problems
impact on your use of
ORAs? Why?

The impact
of the new
law on use

How do you interpret
the new law? Do you
think that it has improved ORA use?
Do you think that it has
redressed the climate
of distrust that prevails
between buyers and
suppliers? How?

How do you interpret
the new law? Do you
think that it has improved your ORA use?
How?
Has it remedied the
climate of distrust that
prevailed between you
and suppliers? How?

How do you interpret
the new law? Do you
think that it has improved your ORA use?
How?
Has it remedied the
climate of distrust that
prevailed between you
and buyers? How?

ORA use
enablers
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APPENDIX B: SAMPLING LOGIC
Informant
categories

Sampling details

Material interest in
the ORA technology

The use perspective
(research question)

The
technology
initiators

Eighteen
initiators
(phase 1) and four initiators (phase 2)
This group includes
stakeholders such as
the organization and
B2B project manager
(our key informant),
Electronic Marketplace
managers, an ORA coordinator, Information
Systems director, general manager of B2B
relationships

The initiators of the
technology, including
our key informant, have
a significant material interest in the IOS since
they are responsible for
sourcing, identifying
and promoting its use
(buyers and suppliers
in this context). The
more that buyers and
suppliers use the technology, the more this
group is effective.

The role of the technology initiators is to promote, persuade, assist
and support the use
of all IOS (including
ORAs) by buyers and
consequently by suppliers.

buy- Buyers constitute the
1) and group who theoretibuyers cally benefit the most
from the use of this
IOS. The initiators of
the technology presented it as a significant
means to boost buyers’ purchasing performance.

Theoretically, buyers
are the first group to
decide on the use of
the IOS. While the retailer’s
management
team adopted the IOS,
it decided that the buyers should be free to
decide the extent to
which they use the IOS
or not.

Buyers

Suppliers

Seventeen
ers (phase
twenty-nine
(phase 2)

Thirty-two
suppliers
(phase 1) and twenty-two suppliers (phase
2)

Suppliers
constitute
the users to whom the
initiators of the technology needed to promote the theoretical
advantages of the use
of the IOS, such as new
market penetration and
benchmarking
with
global competitors.

Theoretically, suppliers
are free to decide with
the buyers who already
use the IOS the extent
to which they use it or
not.
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APPENDIX C: CODING LIST
Codes

Enablers to
ORA use
Perceived
outcomes

Sub-codes

sources

Transparency

Carter et al. (2004)

Improved buyer performance

Jap (2003)

Extended sourcing horizons

Daly & Nath (2005)

Opportunity to penetrate new mar- Emiliani (2000)
kets
Benchmarking against competitors

Daly & Nath (2005)

Fear of losing control over the pur- Jap (2003)
chasing process
Barriers to
ORA use

Competition with the system

Emergent

Buyer’s opportunism

Jap (2003)

Climate of distrust

Carter et al. (2004)

Capacity to select suppliers up front Emergent
and write request for quotation.
Capabilities

E-sourcing technology and supplier Emergent
databases
Existing skills such as negotiation, Emergent
quick response and innovation become redundant for competition
Suppliers’ reluctance to call for con- Emergent
trols

The law failed to put an end to dis- Emergent
Enablers and/or barriers trust
arising from
The law can be bypassed
Emergent
the new law
Risk of controls and sanctions dis- Emergent
suade buyers from using ORAs
ORA use complicated because of the Emergent
law
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